| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20925 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20925 |
| Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate Assembly | |
| Martin L. Weitzman | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper posits the conceptually useful allegory of a futuristic "World Climate Assembly" that votes on global carbon emissions via the basic principle of majority rule. Two variants are considered. One is to vote on a universal price (or tax) that is internationally harmonized, but the proceeds from which are domestically retained. The other is to vote on the overall quantity of total worldwide emissions, which are then distributed for free (via a pre-decided fractional subdivision formula) as individual allowance permits that are subsequently marketed in an international cap-and-trade system. The model of the paper suggests that the majority-voted price is likely to be less distortionary and easier to enact than the majority-voted total quantity of permits. While the study is centered on a formal model, the tone of the policy discussion resembles more an exploratory think piece. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Public Economics ; Public Goods ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Environment |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20925 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578599 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin L. Weitzman. Voting on Prices vs. Voting on Quantities in a World Climate Assembly. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Martin L. Weitzman]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Martin L. Weitzman]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Martin L. Weitzman]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
