| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20930 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20930 |
| State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Donghua Chen; Dequan Jiang; Haitian Lu; Mingming Zhou | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the efficiency of capital allocations at state-controlled and privately owned business groups in China. Using highly granular data on within-group capital transfers, we document stark differences: while private groups allocate more capital to units with better investment opportunities, state groups do the opposite, especially when part of the “national team.” Minority shareholders in state owned enterprises suffer as a result. External monitoring by outside investors helps discipline state groups’ tendency to ignore investment opportunities. We trace capital allocation decisions to the objectives of the Chinese Communist Party, which incentivizes managers to maintain social stability. Consistent with the party’s policy preferences, capital allocations are used to prop up struggling employers in high-unemployment areas and when many young men enter the local labor market, but the interests of the party and of managers may be misaligned. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20930 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578604 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Donghua Chen,Dequan Jiang,et al. State Capitalism vs. Private Enterprise. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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