| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20936 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20936 |
| Collective Action: Experimental Evidence | |
| María Victoria Anauati; Brian Feld; Sebastian Galiani; Gustavo Torrens | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We conducted a laboratory experiment to test the comparative statics predictions of a new approach to collective action games based on the method of stability sets. We find robust support for the main theoretical predictions. As we increase the payoff of a successful collective action (accruing to all players and only to those who contribute), the share of cooperators increases. The experiment also points to new avenues for refining the theory. We find that, as the payoff of a successful collective action increases, subjects tend to upgrade their prior beliefs as to the expected share of cooperators. Although this does not have a qualitative effect on comparative static predictions, using the reported distribution of beliefs rather than an ad hoc uniform distribution reduces the gap between theoretical predictions and observed outcomes. This finding also allows to decompose the mechanism that leads to more cooperation into a ”belief effect” and a ”range of cooperation effect”. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20936 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578610 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | María Victoria Anauati,Brian Feld,Sebastian Galiani,et al. Collective Action: Experimental Evidence. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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