| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20942 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20942 |
| Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets? | |
| Matthew Backus; Tom Blake; Dimitriy V. Masterov; Steven Tadelis | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-02-09 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A common complaint about online auctions for consumer goods is the presence of "snipers," who place bids in the final seconds of sequential ascending auctions with predetermined ending times. The literature conjectures that snipers are best-responding to the existence of "incremental" bidders that bid up to their valuation only as they are outbid. Snipers aim to catch these incremental bidders at a price below their reserve, with no time to respond. As a consequence, these incremental bidders may experience regret when they are outbid at the last moment at a price below their reservation value. We measure the effect of this experience on a new buyer's propensity to participate in future auctions. We show the effect to be causal using a carefully selected subset of auctions from eBay.com and instrumental variables estimation strategy. Bidders respond to sniping quite strongly and are between 4 and 18 percent less likely to return to the platform. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20942 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578615 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Backus,Tom Blake,Dimitriy V. Masterov,et al. Is Sniping A Problem For Online Auction Markets?. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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