| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20975 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20975 |
| A Quantitative Analysis of Subsidy Competition in the U.S. | |
| Ralph Ossa | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I use a quantitative economic geography model to explore subsidy competition among U.S. states. I ask what motivates state governments to subsidize firm relocations and quantify how strong their incentives are. I also characterize fully non-cooperative and cooperative subsidy choices and assess how far away we are from these extremes. I find that states have strong incentives to subsidize firm relocations in order to gain at the expense of other states. I also find that observed subsidies are closer to cooperative than non-cooperative subsidies but the potential losses from an escalation of subsidy competition are large. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Trade ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Regional Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20975 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578650 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ralph Ossa. A Quantitative Analysis of Subsidy Competition in the U.S.. 2015. |
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