| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w20977 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20977 |
| Old and Young Politicians | |
| Alberto F. Alesina; Ugo Troiano; Traviss Cassidy | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-02 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We evaluate the effect of a politician’s age on political governance, reelection rates,and policies using data on Italian local governments. Our results suggest that younger politicians are more likely to behave strategically in response to election incentives: they increase spending and obtain more transfers from higher levels of government in preelection years. We argue that is a sign of stronger career concerns incentives. The results are robust to adopting three different identification strategies: fixed-effects regression, standard regression discontinuity design, and an augmented regression discontinuity design that controls for residual heterogeneity. |
| 主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Subnational Fiscal Issues ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20977 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578652 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto F. Alesina,Ugo Troiano,Traviss Cassidy. Old and Young Politicians. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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