| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w20981
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 20981
|
| Regulating Innovation with Uncertain Quality: Information, Risk, and Access in Medical Devices |
| Matthew Grennan; Robert Town
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-02
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study the impact of regulating product entry and quality information requirements on an oligopoly equilibrium and consumer welfare. Product testing can reduce consumer uncertainty, but also increase entry costs and delay entry. Using variation between EU and US medical device regulations, we document patterns consistent with valuable learning from more stringent US requirements. To derive welfare implications, we pair the data with a model of supply, demand, and testing regulation. US policy is indistinguishable from the policy that maximizes total surplus in our estimated model, while the EU could benefit from more testing. “Post-market surveillance” could further increase surplus. |
| 主题 | Health, Education, and Welfare
; Health
; Industrial Organization
; Market Structure and Firm Performance
; Regulatory Economics
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w20981
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578656
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Matthew Grennan,Robert Town. Regulating Innovation with Uncertain Quality: Information, Risk, and Access in Medical Devices. 2015.
|
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