| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21001 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21001 |
| Social Learning and Selective Attention | |
| Andrew Caplin; John Leahy; Filip Matějka | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-09 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Popularity is self reinforcing. The attention garnered by popular options propels further interest in them. Yet rather than blindly follow the crowd, most pay attention to how well these items match their tastes. We model this role of social learning in guiding selective attention and market dynamics. We confirm that attention focuses on options that quickly achieve popularity. Information externalities render the chosen set smaller than socially optimal. This rationalizes antitrust policies that encourage early experimentation. When attention costs are based on Shannon entropy, optimal policies are computable. With rich data, optimal choices can be identified for all consumer types. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21001 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578675 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Andrew Caplin,John Leahy,Filip Matějka. Social Learning and Selective Attention. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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