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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w21005 |
来源ID | Working Paper 21005 |
Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts | |
Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka; Oliver Hart | |
发表日期 | 2015-03-09 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Parties often regulate their relationships through “continuing” contracts that are neither long-term nor short-term but usually roll over. We study the trade-off between long-term, short-term, and continuing contracts in a two period model where gains from trade exist in the first period, and may or may not exist in the second period. A long-term contract that mandates trade in both periods is disadvantageous since renegotiation is required if there are no gains from trade in the second period. A short-term contract is disadvantageous since a new contract must be negotiated if gains from trade exist in the second period. A continuing contract can be better. In a continuing contract there is no obligation to trade in the second period but if there are gains from trade the parties will bargain “in good faith” using the first period contract as a reference point. This can reduce the cost of negotiating the next contract. Continuing contracts are not a panacea, however, since good faith bargaining may preclude the use of outside options in the bargaining process and as a result parties will sometimes fail to trade when this is efficient. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Law and Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21005 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578678 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maija Halonen-Akatwijuka,Oliver Hart. Short-term, Long-term, and Continuing Contracts. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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