全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Reference Points and Redistributive Preferences: Experimental Evidence

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w21009
来源ID	Working Paper 21009
	Reference Points and Redistributive Preferences: Experimental Evidence
	Jimmy Charité; Raymond Fisman; Ilyana Kuziemko
发表日期	2015-03-09
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	If individuals evaluate outcomes relative to the status quo, then a social planner may limit redistribution from rich to poor even in the absence of moral hazard. We present two experiments suggesting that individuals, placed in the position of a social planner, do in fact respect the reference points of others. First, subjects are given the opportunity to redistribute unequal, unearned initial endowments between two anonymous recipients. They redistribute significantly less when the recipients know the initial endowments (and thus may have formed corresponding reference points) than when the recipients do not know (when we observe near-complete redistribution). Subjects who are themselves risk-seeking over losses drive the effect, suggesting they project their own loss-aversion onto the recipients. In a separate experiment, respondents are asked to choose a tax rate for someone who (due to luck) became rich either five or one year(s) ago. Subjects faced with the five-year scenario choose a lower tax rate, indicating respect for the more deeply embedded (five-year) reference point. Our results thus suggest that respect for reference points of the wealthy may help explain why voters demand less redistribution than standard models predict.
主题	Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w21009
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578682
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jimmy Charité,Raymond Fisman,Ilyana Kuziemko. Reference Points and Redistributive Preferences: Experimental Evidence. 2015.