| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21026 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21026 |
| Gambling for Redemption and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises | |
| Juan Carlos Conesa; Timothy J. Kehoe | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-16 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a model for analyzing the sovereign debt crises of 2010–2013 in the Eurozone. The government sets its expenditure-debt policy optimally. The need to sell large quantities of bonds every period leaves the government vulnerable to self-fulfilling crises in which investors, anticipating a crisis, are unwilling to buy the bonds, thereby provoking the crisis. In this situation, the optimal policy of the government is to reduce its debt to a level where crises are not possible. If, however, the economy is in a recession where there is a positive probability of recovery in fiscal revenues, the government may optimally choose to “gamble for redemption,” running deficits and increasing its debt, thereby increasing its vulnerability to crises. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; International Finance ; International Macroeconomics ; Financial Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21026 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578699 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Juan Carlos Conesa,Timothy J. Kehoe. Gambling for Redemption and Self-Fulfilling Debt Crises. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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