| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21046 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21046 |
| The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match | |
| Atila Abdulkadiroğlu; Nikhil Agarwal; Parag A. Pathak | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-03-30 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Coordinated single-offer school assignment systems are a popular education reform. We show that uncoordinated offers in NYC’s school assignment mechanism generated mismatches. One-third of applicants were unassigned after the main round and later administratively placed at less desirable schools. We evaluate the effects of the new coordinated mechanism based on deferred acceptance using estimated student preferences. The new mechanism achieves 80% of the possible gains from a no-choice neighborhood extreme to a utilitarian benchmark. Coordinating offers dominates the effects of further algorithm modifications. Students most likely to be previously administratively assigned experienced the largest gains in welfare and subsequent achievement. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Market Structure and Distribution ; General Equilibrium ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21046 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578718 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Atila Abdulkadiroğlu,Nikhil Agarwal,Parag A. Pathak. The Welfare Effects of Coordinated Assignment: Evidence from the NYC HS Match. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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