| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21077 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21077 |
| Loss Aversion in Politics | |
| Alberto Alesina; Francesco Passarelli | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study loss aversion in majority voting. First, we show a status quo bias. Second, loss aversion implies a moderating effect. Third, in a dynamic setting, the effect of loss aversion diminishes with the length of the planning horizon of voters; however, in the presence of a projection bias, majorities are partially unable to understand how fast they will adapt. Fourth, in a stochastic environment, loss aversion yields a significant distaste for risk, but also a smaller attachment to the status quo. The application of these results to a model of redistribution leads to empirically plausible implications. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21077 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578752 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Francesco Passarelli. Loss Aversion in Politics. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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