| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21090 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21090 |
| An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-up | |
| Alexander Galetovic; Stephen Haber; Ross Levine | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-04-13 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A large literature asserts that standard essential patents (SEPs) allow their owners to “hold up” innovation by charging fees that exceed their incremental contribution to a final product. We evaluate two central, interrelated predictions of this SEP hold-up hypothesis: (1) SEP-reliant industries should experience more stagnant quality-adjusted prices than similar non-SEP-reliant industries; and (2) court decisions that reduce the excessive power of SEP holders should accelerate innovation in SEP-reliant industries. We find no empirical support for either prediction. Indeed, SEP-reliant industries have the fastest quality-adjusted price declines in the U.S. economy. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21090 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578765 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Galetovic,Stephen Haber,Ross Levine. An Empirical Examination of Patent Hold-up. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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