| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21102 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21102 |
| Borrowing from the Future: 401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults | |
| Timothy (Jun) Lu; Olivia S. Mitchell; Stephen P. Utkus; Jean A. Young | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Tax-qualified retirement plans seek to promote saving for retirement, yet most employers permit pre- retirement access by letting 401(k) participants borrow plan assets. This paper examines who borrows and why, and who defaults on their loans. Our administrative dataset tracks several hundred plans over 5 years, showing that 20% borrow at any given time, and almost 40% do at some point over five years. Employer policies influence borrowing behavior, in that workers are more likely to borrow and borrow more in aggregate, when a plan permits multiple loans. We estimate loan default “leakage” at $6 billion annually, more than prior studies. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Public Economics ; Taxation ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21102 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578777 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Timothy ,Olivia S. Mitchell,Stephen P. Utkus,et al. Borrowing from the Future: 401(k) Plan Loans and Loan Defaults. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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