| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21104 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21104 |
| Salience, Myopia, and Complex Dynamic Incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D | |
| Christina M. Dalton; Gautam Gowrisankaran; Robert Town | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-04-20 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The standard Medicare Part D drug insurance contract is nonlinear—with reduced subsidies in a coverage gap—resulting in a dynamic purchase problem. We consider enrollees who arrived near the gap early in the year and show that they should expect to enter the gap with high probability, implying that, under a benchmark model with neoclassical preferences, the gap should impact them very little. We find that these enrollees have flat spending in a period before the doughnut hole and a large spending drop in the gap, providing evidence against the benchmark model. We structurally estimate behavioral dynamic drug purchase models and find that a price salience model where enrollees do not incorporate future prices into their decision making at all fits the data best. For a nationally representative sample, full price salience would decrease enrollee spending by 31%. Entirely eliminating the gap would increase insurer spending 27%, compared to 7% for generic-drug-only gap coverage. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Industrial Organization ; Industry Studies |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21104 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578779 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christina M. Dalton,Gautam Gowrisankaran,Robert Town. Salience, Myopia, and Complex Dynamic Incentives: Evidence from Medicare Part D. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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