| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21151 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21151 |
| A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability | |
| S. Borağan Aruoba; Allan Drazen; Razvan Vlaicu | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-11 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper proposes a structural approach to measuring the effects of electoral accountability. We estimate a political agency model with imperfect information in order to identify and quantify discipline and selection effects, using data on U.S. governors for 1982-2012. We find that the possibility of reelection provides a significant incentive for incumbents to exert effort. We also find a selection effect, although it is weaker in terms of its effect on average governor performance. According to our model, the widely-used two-term regime improves voter welfare by 4.2% compared to a one-term regime, and find that a three-term regime may improve voter welfare even further. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21151 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578826 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | S. Borağan Aruoba,Allan Drazen,Razvan Vlaicu. A Structural Model of Electoral Accountability. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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