| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21185 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21185 |
| Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program | |
| Lorenzo Casaburi; Ugo Troiano | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-26 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The incentives of political agents to enforce tax collection are key determinants of the levels of compliance. We study the electoral response to the Ghost Buildings program, a nationwide anti-tax evasion policy in Italy that used innovative monitoring technologies to target buildings hidden from tax authorities. The program induced monetary and non-monetary benefits for non-evaders. A one standard deviation increase in town-level program intensity leads to a 4.8 percent increase in local incumbent reelection rates. In addition, these political returns are higher in areas with lower tax evasion tolerance and with higher efficiency of public good provision, implying complementarity among enforcement policies, the underlying tax culture, and the quality of the government. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21185 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578859 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Lorenzo Casaburi,Ugo Troiano. Ghost-House Busters: The Electoral Response to a Large Anti Tax Evasion Program. 2015. |
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