| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21186 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21186 |
| Rigidity of Public Contracts | |
| Marian Moszoro; Pablo T. Spiller; Sebastian Stolorz | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-26 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We apply algorithmic data reading and textual analysis to compare the features of contracts in regulated industries subject to public scrutiny (which we call "public contracts") with relational private contracts. We show that public contracts are lengthier and have more rule-based rigid clauses; in addition, their renegotiation is formalized in amendments. We also find that contract length and the frequency of rigidity clauses increases in political contestability and closer to upcoming elections. We maintain that the higher rigidity of public contracts is a political risk adaptation strategy carried out by public agents attempting to lower third-party opportunistic challenges. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Public Economics ; National Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21186 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578860 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marian Moszoro,Pablo T. Spiller,Sebastian Stolorz. Rigidity of Public Contracts. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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