| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21201 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21201 |
| Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity | |
| Miguel Faria-e-Castro; Joseba Martinez; Thomas Philippon | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-05-26 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the optimal use of disclosure and fiscal backstops during financial crises. Providing information can reduce adverse selection in credit markets, but negative disclosures can also trigger inefficient bank runs. In our model governments are thus forced to choose between runs and lemons. A fiscal backstop mitigates the risk of runs and allows a government to pursue a high disclosure strategy. Our model explains why governments with strong fiscal positions are more likely to run informative stress tests, and, paradoxically, how they can end up spending less than governments that are more fiscally constrained. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics ; Money and Interest Rates ; Monetary Policy ; Fiscal Policy ; Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21201 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578875 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Miguel Faria-e-Castro,Joseba Martinez,Thomas Philippon. Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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