全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): The Political Economy of Public Income Volatility: With an Application to the Resource Curse

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w21205
来源ID	Working Paper 21205
	The Political Economy of Public Income Volatility: With an Application to the Resource Curse
	James A. Robinson; Ragnar Torvik; Thierry Verdier
发表日期	2015-05-26
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	We develop a model of the political consequences of public income volatility. As is standard, political incentives create inefficient policies, but we show that making income uncertain creates specific new effects. Future volatility reduces the benefit of being in power, making policy more efficient. Yet at the same time it also reduces the re-election probability of an incumbent and since some of the policy inefficiencies are concentrated in the future, this makes inefficient policy less costly. We show how this model can help think about the connection between volatility and economic growth and in the case where volatility comes from volatile natural resource prices, a characteristic of many developing countries, we show that volatility in itself is a source of inefficient resource extraction.
主题	Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Environmental and Resource Economics ; Renewable Resources
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w21205
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578879
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	James A. Robinson,Ragnar Torvik,Thierry Verdier. The Political Economy of Public Income Volatility: With an Application to the Resource Curse. 2015.