| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21231 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21231 |
| Majority Choice of Tax Systems in Single- and Multi-Jurisdictional Economies | |
| Stephen Calabrese; Dennis Epple; Richard Romano | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-06-08 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine majority choice of tax instruments in single- and multi-jurisdictional economies with heterogeneous households. In our framework majority voting equilibrium exists despite the multidimensional policy choice set. We identify five competing incentives that influence choice of tax instruments. Equilibria generally entail a mixture of tax types. With multiple jurisdictions, strong reliance on head taxation in rich communities arises to deter poorer households from immigrating. Mobility fundamentally affects the equilibrium tax system with redistribution incentives dominating choice of instruments when mobility is limited. Limiting or eliminating head taxation fundamentally alters stratification, public good provision levels, and tax systems. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; Subnational Fiscal Issues |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21231 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578906 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Stephen Calabrese,Dennis Epple,Richard Romano. Majority Choice of Tax Systems in Single- and Multi-Jurisdictional Economies. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
