| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21264 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21264 |
| Shaming Tax Delinquents | |
| Ricardo Perez-Truglia; Ugo Troiano | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-06-15 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Many federal and local governments rely on shaming penalties to achieve policy goals, but little is known about how shaming works. Such penalties may be ineffective, or even backfire by crowding out intrinsic motivation. In this paper, we study shaming in the context of the collection of tax delinquencies. We sent letters to 34,334 tax delinquents who owed a total of half a billion dollars in three U.S. states. We randomized some of the information contained in the letter to vary the salience of financial penalties, shaming penalties, and peer comparisons. We then measured the effects of this information on subsequent payment rates, and found that increasing the visibility of delinquency status increases compliance by individuals who have debts below $2,500, but has no significant effect on individuals with larger debt amounts. Financial reminders have a positive effect on payment rates independent of the size of the debt, while information about the delinquency of neighbors has no effect on payment rates. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Taxation ; National Fiscal Issues ; Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21264 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578939 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ricardo Perez-Truglia,Ugo Troiano. Shaming Tax Delinquents. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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