| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21285 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21285 |
| Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation | |
| Matthew Backus; Tom Blake; Steven Tadelis | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-06-22 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Can sellers credibly signal their private information to reduce frictions in negotiations? Guided by a simple cheap-talk model, we posit that impatient sellers use round numbers to signal their willingness to cut prices in order to sell faster, and test its implications using millions of online bargaining interactions. Items listed at multiples of $100 receive offers that are 5% - 8% lower but that arrive 6 - 11 days sooner than listings at neighboring "precise" values, and are 3% - 5% more likely to sell. Similar patterns in real estate transactions suggest that round-number signaling plays a broader role in negotiations. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21285 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578959 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Backus,Tom Blake,Steven Tadelis. Cheap Talk, Round Numbers, and the Economics of Negotiation. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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