| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21309 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21309 |
| Two-sided Altruism and Signaling | |
| Garance Genicot | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-06-29 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that when donors and recipients care about each other --two-sided altruism -- the presence of asymmetry of information about the donor's income leads very naturally to a signaling game. A donor who cares about the recipient's welfare has incentives to appear richer than he is when the recipient cares about him. Similarly, asymmetry of information regarding the donor's income generates a signaling game in the presence of two-sided altruism. These signaling games put upward pressure on transfers and this pressure increases with the altruism of the recipient. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; International Economics ; International Factor Mobility ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21309 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/578984 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Garance Genicot. Two-sided Altruism and Signaling. 2015. |
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