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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w21328
来源IDWorking Paper 21328
Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion
Fernando Alvarez; Gadi Barlevy
发表日期2015-07-13
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要This paper explores whether mandatory disclosure of bank balance sheet information can improve welfare. In our benchmark model, mandatory disclosure can raise welfare only when markets are frozen, i.e. when investors refuse to fund banks in the absence of balance sheet information. Even then, intervention is only warranted if there is sufficient contagion across banks, in a sense we make precise within our model. In the same benchmark model, if in the absence of balance sheet information investors would fund banks, mandatory disclosure cannot raise welfare and it will be desirable to forbid banks to disclose their financial positions. When we modify the model to allow banks to engage in moral hazard, mandatory disclosure can increase welfare in normal times. But the case for intervention still hinges on there being sufficient contagion. Finally, we argue disclosure represents a substitute to other financial reforms rather than complement them as some have argued.
主题Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21328
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579001
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Fernando Alvarez,Gadi Barlevy. Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion. 2015.
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