| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w21328
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21328
|
| Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion |
| Fernando Alvarez; Gadi Barlevy
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-13
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | This paper explores whether mandatory disclosure of bank balance sheet information can improve welfare. In our benchmark model, mandatory disclosure can raise welfare only when markets are frozen, i.e. when investors refuse to fund banks in the absence of balance sheet information. Even then, intervention is only warranted if there is sufficient contagion across banks, in a sense we make precise within our model. In the same benchmark model, if in the absence of balance sheet information investors would fund banks, mandatory disclosure cannot raise welfare and it will be desirable to forbid banks to disclose their financial positions. When we modify the model to allow banks to engage in moral hazard, mandatory disclosure can increase welfare in normal times. But the case for intervention still hinges on there being sufficient contagion. Finally, we argue disclosure represents a substitute to other financial reforms rather than complement them as some have argued. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics
; Financial Markets
; Corporate Finance
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21328
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
|
| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579001
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Fernando Alvarez,Gadi Barlevy. Mandatory Disclosure and Financial Contagion. 2015.
|
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