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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w21338 |
来源ID | Working Paper 21338 |
A Theory of Civil Disobedience | |
Edward L. Glaeser; Cass R. Sunstein | |
发表日期 | 2015-07-13 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | From the streets of Hong Kong to Ferguson, Missouri, civil disobedience has again become newsworthy. What explains the prevalence and extremity of acts of civil disobedience?This paper presents a model in which protest planners choose the nature of the disturbance hoping to influence voters (or other decision-makers in less democratic regimes) both through the size of the unrest and by generating a response. The model suggests that protesters will either choose a mild “epsilon” protest, such as a peaceful march, which serves mainly to signal the size of the disgruntled population, or a “sweet spot” protest, which is painful enough to generate a response but not painful enough so that an aggressive response is universally applauded. Since non-epsilon protests serve primarily to signal the leaders’ type, they will occur either when protesters have private information about the leader’s type or when the distribution of voters’ preferences are convex in a way that leads the revelation of uncertainty to increase the probability of regime change. The requirements needed for rational civil disobedience seem not to hold in many world settings, and so we explore ways in which bounded rationality by protesters, voters, and incumbent leaders can also explain civil disobedience. |
主题 | Other ; Law and Economics ; Economic Systems ; Regional and Urban Economics |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21338 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579010 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Edward L. Glaeser,Cass R. Sunstein. A Theory of Civil Disobedience. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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