| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21364 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21364 |
| When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable? | |
| Jean-Etienne de Bettignies; David T. Robinson | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-20 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study a model in which corporate social responsibility (CSR) arises as a response to inefficient regulation. In our model, firms, governments, and workers interact. Firms generate profits but create negative spillovers that can be attenuated through government regulation, which is set endogenously and may or may not be socially optimal. Governments may choose suboptimal levels of regulation if they face lobbying pressure from companies. Companies can, in turn, hire socially responsible employees who enjoy taking actions to ameliorate the negative spillovers. Because firms can capture part of the rent created by allowing socially responsible employees to correct social ills, in some settings they find it optimal to lobby for inefficient rules and then capture the surplus associated with being "good citizens" in the face of bad regulation. In equilibrium, this means CSR can either increase or decrease social welfare, depending on the costs of political capture. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21364 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579037 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean-Etienne de Bettignies,David T. Robinson. When Is Social Responsibility Socially Desirable?. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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