| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21406 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21406 |
| Nudges in Exercise Commitment Contracts: A Randomized Trial | |
| Jay Bhattacharya; Alan M. Garber; Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-07-27 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider the welfare consequences of nudges and other behavioral economic devices to encourage exercise habit formation. We analyze a randomized trial of nudged exercise commitment contracts in the context of a time-inconsistent intertemporal utility maximization model of the demand for exercise. The trial follows more than 4,000 people seeking to make exercise commitments. Each person was randomly nudged towards making longer (20 weeks) or shorter (8 weeks) exercise commitment contracts. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21406 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579080 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jay Bhattacharya,Alan M. Garber,Jeremy D. Goldhaber-Fiebert. Nudges in Exercise Commitment Contracts: A Randomized Trial. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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