| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21422 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21422 |
| Elections and Divisiveness: Theory and Evidence | |
| Elliott Ash; Massimo Morelli; Richard Van Weelden | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-03 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper analyzes the effort allocation choices of incumbent politicians when voters are uncertain about politician preferences. There is a pervasive incentive to "posture" by over-providing effort to pursue divisive policies, even if all voters would strictly prefer to have a consensus policy implemented. As such, the desire of politicians to convince voters that their preferences are aligned with the majority of the electorate can lead them to choose strictly pareto dominated effort allocations. Transparency over the politicians' effort choices can re-enforce the distortions, and for some parameters can be bad both for incentivizing politicians to focus on socially efficient tasks and for allowing voters to select congruent politicians. We take our theoretical results to the data with an empirical analysis of how Members of the U.S. Congress allocate time across issues in their floor speeches. Consistent with the theory, we find evidence of political posturing due to elections among U.S. Senators. We also demonstrate empirically that, among U.S. House Members, increased transparency can lead to more divisive speech. |
| 主题 | Other ; Economic Systems |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21422 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579097 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Elliott Ash,Massimo Morelli,Richard Van Weelden. Elections and Divisiveness: Theory and Evidence. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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