| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21475 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21475 |
| Self-Signaling and Prosocial Behavior: a Cause Marketing Mobile Field Experiment | |
| Jean-Pierre Dubé; Xueming Luo; Zheng Fang | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-24 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We empirically test an information economics based theory of social preferences in which ego utility and self-signaling can potentially crowd out the effect of consumption utility on choices. Two large-scale, randomized controlled field experiments involving a consumer good and charitable donations are conducted using a subject pool of actual consumers. We find that bundling relatively large charitable donations with a consumer good can generate non-monotonic regions of demand. Consumers also self-report significantly lower ratings of “feeling good about themselves” when a large donation is bundled with a large price discount for the good. The combined evidence supports the self-signaling theory whereby price discounts crowd out a consumer’s self-inference of altruism from buying a good bundled with a charitable donation. Alternative theories of motivation crowding are unable to fit the non-monotonic moments in the data. A structural model of self-signaling is fit to the data to quantify the economic magnitude of ego utility and its role in driving consumer decisions. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Game Theory ; Econometrics ; Experimental Design ; Behavioral Economics ; Households and Firms ; Economics of Information ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21475 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579150 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jean-Pierre Dubé,Xueming Luo,Zheng Fang. Self-Signaling and Prosocial Behavior: a Cause Marketing Mobile Field Experiment. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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