| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21494 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21494 |
| Double Liability at Early American Banks | |
| Howard Bodenhorn | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-24 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Limited liability is a defining feature of the modern corporation, but it was not always so. By the early 1850s about one-half of all states imposed double liability on bank shareholders. This paper shows that double liability was adopted as deposits increased relative to banknotes and in conjunction with free banking; that double liability was associated with more concentrated bank shareholdings, but had little effect on share liquidity; that it increased the price of bank debt; and, that a regulatory change toward greater shareholder liability increased bank leverage ratios. In forcing bank shareholders to have more “skin in the game,” double liability changed bank investor, creditor and managerial behaviors. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; Other ; Law and Economics ; History ; Financial History |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21494 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579169 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Howard Bodenhorn. Double Liability at Early American Banks. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Howard Bodenhorn]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Howard Bodenhorn]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Howard Bodenhorn]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
