| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21495 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21495 |
| Efficiency and Information Transmission in Bilateral Trading | |
| Robert Shimer; Iván Werning | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-08-24 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study pairwise trading mechanisms in the presence of private information and limited commitment, whereby either trader can walk away from a proposed trade when he learns the trading price. We show that when one trader's information is relevant for the other trader's value of the asset, optimal trading arrangements may necessarily conceal the traders' information. While limited commitment itself may not be costly, it shapes how prices transmit information. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21495 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579170 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Shimer,Iván Werning. Efficiency and Information Transmission in Bilateral Trading. 2015. |
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