全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): Public Audit Oversight and Reporting Credibility: Evidence from the PCAOB Inspection Regime

G2TT

来源类型	Working Paper
规范类型	报告
DOI	10.3386/w21530
来源ID	Working Paper 21530
	Public Audit Oversight and Reporting Credibility: Evidence from the PCAOB Inspection Regime
	Brandon Gipper; Christian Leuz; Mark Maffett
发表日期	2015-09-07
出版年	2015
语种	英语
摘要	This paper studies the impact of public audit oversight on financial reporting credibility. We analyze changes in market responses to earnings news after public audit oversight is introduced, exploiting that the regime onset depends on fiscal year-ends, auditors, and the rollout of auditor inspections. We find that investors respond more strongly to earnings news following public audit oversight. Corroborating these findings, we find an increase in volume responses to 10-K filings after the new regime. Our results show that public audit oversight can enhance reporting credibility and that this credibility is priced in capital markets.
主题	Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Corporate Finance ; Other ; Law and Economics ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel
URL	https://www.nber.org/papers/w21530
来源智库	National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579205
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Brandon Gipper,Christian Leuz,Mark Maffett. Public Audit Oversight and Reporting Credibility: Evidence from the PCAOB Inspection Regime. 2015.