| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w21540
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21540
|
| The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy |
| Sharun Mukand; Dani Rodrik
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-09-07
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We distinguish between three sets of rights – property rights, political rights, and civil rights – and provide a taxonomy of political regimes. The distinctive nature of liberal democracy is that it protects civil rights (equality before the law for minorities) in addition to the other two. Democratic transitions are typically the product of a settlement between the elite (who care mostly about property rights) and the majority (who care mostly about political rights). Such settlements rarely produce liberal democracy, as the minority has neither the resources nor the numbers to make a contribution at the bargaining table. We develop a formal model to sharpen the contrast between electoral and liberal democracies and highlight circumstances under which liberal democracy can emerge. We discuss informally the difference between social mobilizations sparked by industrialization and decolonization. Since the latter revolve around identity cleavages rather than class cleavages, they are less conducive to liberal politics. |
| 主题 | Other
; Economic Systems
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21540
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| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579215
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Sharun Mukand,Dani Rodrik. The Political Economy of Liberal Democracy. 2015.
|
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