| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21563 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21563 |
| Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management | |
| Nicolae B. Gârleanu; Lasse H. Pedersen | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-09-21 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider a model where investors can invest directly or search for an asset manager, information about assets is costly, and managers charge an endogenous fee. The efficiency of asset prices is linked to the efficiency of the asset management market: if investors can find managers more easily, more money is allocated to active management, fees are lower, and asset prices are more efficient. Informed managers outperform after fees, uninformed managers underperform after fees, and the net performance of the average manager depends on the number of "noise allocators." Finally, we show why large investors should be active and discuss broader implications and welfare considerations. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; General Equilibrium ; Economics of Information ; Financial Economics ; Portfolio Selection and Asset Pricing ; Financial Markets ; Financial Institutions ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21563 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579238 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Nicolae B. Gârleanu,Lasse H. Pedersen. Efficiently Inefficient Markets for Assets and Asset Management. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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