| 来源类型 | Working Paper
|
| 规范类型 | 报告
|
| DOI | 10.3386/w21569
|
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21569
|
| Gradualism in Monetary Policy: A Time-Consistency Problem? |
| Jeremy C. Stein; Adi Sunderam
|
| 发表日期 | 2015-09-21
|
| 出版年 | 2015
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We develop a model of monetary policy with two key features: (i) the central bank has private information about its long-run target for the policy rate; and (ii) the central bank is averse to bond-market volatility. In this setting, discretionary monetary policy is gradualist, or inertial, in the sense that the central bank only adjusts the policy rate slowly in response to changes in its privately-observed target. Such gradualism reflects an attempt to not spook the bond market. However, this effort ends up being thwarted in equilibrium, as long-term rates rationally react more to a given move in short rates when the central bank moves more gradually. The same desire to mitigate bond-market volatility can lead the central bank to lower short rates sharply when publicly-observed term premiums rise. In both cases, there is a time-consistency problem, and society would be better off appointing a central banker who cares less about the bond market. We also discuss the implications of our model for forward guidance once the economy is away from the zero lower bound. |
| 主题 | Macroeconomics
; Money and Interest Rates
; Monetary Policy
|
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21569
|
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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| 引用统计 |
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| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579244
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Jeremy C. Stein,Adi Sunderam. Gradualism in Monetary Policy: A Time-Consistency Problem?. 2015.
|
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