| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21634 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21634 |
| Insider Trading and Innovation | |
| Ross Levine; Chen Lin; Lai Wei | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-10-12 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper assesses whether legal systems that protect outside investors from corporate insiders increase or decrease the rate of technological innovation. Based on over 75,000 industry-country-year observations across 94 economies from 1976 to 2006, we find that enforcing insider trading laws spurs innovation—as measured by patent intensity, scope, impact, generality, and originality. Consistent with theories that insider trading slows innovation by impeding the valuation of innovative activities, the relationship between enforcing insider trading laws and innovation is much larger in industries that are naturally innovative and opaque, and equity issuances also rise much more in these industries after a country starts enforcing its insider trading laws. |
| 主题 | International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D ; Growth and Productivity |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21634 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579308 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Ross Levine,Chen Lin,Lai Wei. Insider Trading and Innovation. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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