G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w21634
来源IDWorking Paper 21634
Insider Trading and Innovation
Ross Levine; Chen Lin; Lai Wei
发表日期2015-10-12
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要This paper assesses whether legal systems that protect outside investors from corporate insiders increase or decrease the rate of technological innovation. Based on over 75,000 industry-country-year observations across 94 economies from 1976 to 2006, we find that enforcing insider trading laws spurs innovation—as measured by patent intensity, scope, impact, generality, and originality. Consistent with theories that insider trading slows innovation by impeding the valuation of innovative activities, the relationship between enforcing insider trading laws and innovation is much larger in industries that are naturally innovative and opaque, and equity issuances also rise much more in these industries after a country starts enforcing its insider trading laws.
主题International Economics ; Globalization and International Relations ; Financial Economics ; Financial Markets ; Development and Growth ; Innovation and R& ; D ; Growth and Productivity
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21634
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579308
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ross Levine,Chen Lin,Lai Wei. Insider Trading and Innovation. 2015.
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