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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w21640 |
来源ID | Working Paper 21640 |
Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More? | |
Kala Krishna; Sergey Lychagin; Verónica Frisancho Robles | |
发表日期 | 2015-10-19 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | Placement, both in university and in the civil service, according to performance in competitive exams is the norm in much of the world. Repeat taking of such exams is common despite the private and social costs it imposes. We develop and estimate a structural model of exam retaking using data from Turkey's university placement exam. We find that limiting retaking, though individually harmful given the equilibrium, actually increases expected welfare across the board. This result comes from a general equilibrium effect: retakers crowd the market and impose negative spillovers on others by raising acceptance cutoffs. |
主题 | Econometrics ; Estimation Methods ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Education |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21640 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579315 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Kala Krishna,Sergey Lychagin,Verónica Frisancho Robles. Retaking in High Stakes Exams: Is Less More?. 2015. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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