G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w21702
来源IDWorking Paper 21702
Training and Search On the Job
Rasmus Lentz; Nicolas Roys
发表日期2015-11-09
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要The paper studies human capital accumulation over workers' careers in an on the job search setting with heterogenous firms. In renegotiation proof employment contracts, more productive firms provide more training. Both general and specific training induce higher wages within jobs, and with future employers, even conditional on the future employer type. Because matches do not internalize the specific capital loss from employer changes, specific human capital can be over-accumulated, more so in low type firms. While validating the Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) mechanisms, the analysis nevertheless arrives at the opposite conclusion: That increased labor market friction reduces training in equilibrium.
主题Microeconomics ; Households and Firms ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Labor Compensation ; Labor Market Structures ; Unemployment and Immigration
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21702
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579377
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Rasmus Lentz,Nicolas Roys. Training and Search On the Job. 2015.
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