| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21709 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21709 |
| Discretion in Hiring | |
| Mitchell Hoffman; Lisa B. Kahn; Danielle Li | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-16 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Job testing technologies enable firms to rely less on human judgement when making hiring decisions. Placing more weight on test scores may improve hiring decisions by reducing the influence of human bias or mistakes but may also lead firms to forgo the potentially valuable private information of their managers. We study the introduction of job testing across 15 firms employing low-skilled service sector workers. When faced with similar applicant pools, we find that managers who appear to hire against test recommendations end up with worse average hires. This suggests that managers often overrule test recommendations because they are biased or mistaken, not only because they have superior private information. |
| 主题 | Labor Economics ; Labor Supply and Demand ; Other ; Accounting, Marketing, and Personnel |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21709 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579384 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mitchell Hoffman,Lisa B. Kahn,Danielle Li. Discretion in Hiring. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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