G2TT
来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w21743
来源IDWorking Paper 21743
Agency Business Cycles
Mikhail Golosov; Guido Menzio
发表日期2015-11-23
出版年2015
语种英语
摘要We propose a new business cycle theory. Firms need to randomize over firing or keeping workers who have performed poorly in the past, in order to give them an ex-ante incentive to exert effort. Firms have an incentive to coordinate the outcome of their randomizations, as coordination allows them to load the firing probability on states of the world in which it is costlier for workers to become unemployed and, hence, allows them to reduce overall agency costs. In the unique robust equilibrium, firms use a sunspot to coordinate the randomization outcomes and the economy experiences endogenous, stochastic aggregate fluctuations.
主题Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Business Cycles
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21743
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
引用统计
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579418
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Mikhail Golosov,Guido Menzio. Agency Business Cycles. 2015.
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