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来源类型 | Working Paper |
规范类型 | 报告 |
DOI | 10.3386/w21743 |
来源ID | Working Paper 21743 |
Agency Business Cycles | |
Mikhail Golosov; Guido Menzio | |
发表日期 | 2015-11-23 |
出版年 | 2015 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We propose a new business cycle theory. Firms need to randomize over firing or keeping workers who have performed poorly in the past, in order to give them an ex-ante incentive to exert effort. Firms have an incentive to coordinate the outcome of their randomizations, as coordination allows them to load the firing probability on states of the world in which it is costlier for workers to become unemployed and, hence, allows them to reduce overall agency costs. In the unique robust equilibrium, firms use a sunspot to coordinate the randomization outcomes and the economy experiences endogenous, stochastic aggregate fluctuations. |
主题 | Microeconomics ; Economics of Information ; Macroeconomics ; Consumption and Investment ; Business Cycles |
URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21743 |
来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
引用统计 | |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579418 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mikhail Golosov,Guido Menzio. Agency Business Cycles. 2015. |
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