| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21758 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21758 |
| An Experimental Study of Decentralized Link Formation with Competition | |
| Margherita Comola; Marcel Fafchamps | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We design a laboratory experiment to investigate bilateral link formation in a setting where payoffs are pair-specific. Our link formation rule is decentralized and players can make link offers and counter-offers, as in a Beckerian marriage market. The game is designed in such a way that a stable equilibrium configuration exists and does not depend on conditions such as initial configuration or order of move. We test whether the theoretical equilibrium is obtained under experimental conditions, and which individual motivations and decision-making techniques lead players to depart from myopic best response. We find that players are remarkably good at attaining a stable equilibrium configuration, which happens in 86% of the games. Results show that complete information speeds up the game via self-censoring, and that sub-optimal choices are mostly driven by over-thinking behavior and reluctance to accept to link with players who have been disloyal earlier in the game. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Behavioral Economics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Development and Growth ; Development |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21758 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579431 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Margherita Comola,Marcel Fafchamps. An Experimental Study of Decentralized Link Formation with Competition. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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