| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21765 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21765 |
| Democratic Rulemaking | |
| John M. de Figueiredo; Edward H. Stiglitz | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-11-30 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper examines to what extent agency rulemaking is democratic. It reviews theories of administrative rulemaking in light of two normative benchmarks: a “democratic” benchmark based on voter preferences, and a “republican” benchmark based on the preferences of elected representatives. It then evaluates how the empirical evidence lines up in light of these two approaches. The paper concludes with a discussion of avenues for future research. |
| 主题 | Other ; Law and Economics |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21765 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579438 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | John M. de Figueiredo,Edward H. Stiglitz. Democratic Rulemaking. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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