| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21786 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21786 |
| Forbearance by Contract: How Building and Loans Mitigated the Mortgage Crisis of the 1930s | |
| Sebastián Fleitas; Price Fishback; Kenneth Snowden | |
| 发表日期 | 2015-12-14 |
| 出版年 | 2015 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | During the Great Depression, Building and Loans (B&Ls), the leading home lenders, had a structure that mitigated the crisis. Borrowers were owners of the B&L and dissolution of the institution required a two-thirds majority vote. Using panel data from New Jersey in the 1930s, we find that this voting rule delayed dissolution by about one year. The year delay allowed one-fourth of the borrowers in the at-risk B&L to pay off their loans, but nonborrowers lost share value. The net loss was roughly -0.67 percent of the value of all New Jersey B&L assets in the mid-1930s. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Financial Institutions ; History ; Financial History ; Regional and Urban Economics ; Real Estate |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21786 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579460 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sebastián Fleitas,Price Fishback,Kenneth Snowden. Forbearance by Contract: How Building and Loans Mitigated the Mortgage Crisis of the 1930s. 2015. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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