| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21833 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21833 |
| Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets | |
| Benjamin Lester; Ali Shourideh; Venky Venkateswaran; Ariel Zetlin-Jones | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-01-04 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We incorporate a search-theoretic model of imperfect competition into an otherwise standard model of asymmetric information with unrestricted contracts. We develop a methodology that allows for a sharp analytical characterization of the unique equilibrium, and then use this characterization to explore the interaction between adverse selection, screening, and imperfect competition. We show how the structure of equilibrium contracts—and hence the relationship between an agent’s type, the quantity he trades, and the corresponding price—is jointly determined by the severity of adverse selection and the concentration of market power. This suggests that quantifying the effects of adverse selection requires controlling for the market structure. We also show that increasing competition and reducing informational asymmetries can be detrimental to welfare. This suggests that recent attempts to increase competition and reduce opacity in markets that suffer from adverse selection could potentially have negative, unforeseen consequences. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Market Structure and Distribution ; Economics of Information ; Industrial Organization ; Market Structure and Firm Performance |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21833 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579507 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Benjamin Lester,Ali Shourideh,Venky Venkateswaran,et al. Screening and Adverse Selection in Frictional Markets. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21833.pdf（834KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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