| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21834 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21834 |
| Sharing Risk with the Government: How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking | |
| Alexander Ljungqvist; Liandong Zhang; Luo Zuo | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-01-04 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Using 113 staggered changes in corporate income tax rates across U.S. states, we provide evidence on how taxes affect corporate risk-taking decisions. Higher taxes reduce expected profits more for risky projects than for safe ones, as the government shares in a firm’s upside but not in its downside. Consistent with this prediction, we find that risk taking is sensitive to taxes, albeit asymmetrically: the average firm reduces risk in response to a tax increase (primarily by changing its operating cycle and reducing R&D risk) but does not respond to a tax cut. We trace the asymmetry back to constraints on risk taking imposed by creditors. Finally, tax loss-offset rules moderate firms’ sensitivity to taxes by allowing firms to partly share downside risk with the government. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Corporate Finance ; Public Economics ; Taxation |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21834 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579508 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alexander Ljungqvist,Liandong Zhang,Luo Zuo. Sharing Risk with the Government: How Taxes Affect Corporate Risk Taking. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21834.pdf（292KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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