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来源类型Working Paper
规范类型报告
DOI10.3386/w21851
来源IDWorking Paper 21851
The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries\u2019 Earnings
Alexander Gelber; Timothy Moore; Alexander Strand
发表日期2016-01-11
出版年2016
语种英语
摘要A crucial issue in studying social insurance programs is whether they affect work decisions through income or substitution effects. We examine this in the context of U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance (DI), one of the largest social insurance programs in the U.S. The formula linking DI payments to past earnings has discontinuous changes in the marginal replacement rate that allow us to use a regression kink design to estimate the effect of payment size on earnings. Using Social Security Administration data on all new DI beneficiaries from 2001 to 2007, we document a robust income effect of DI payments on earnings. Our preferred estimate is that an increase in DI payments of one dollar causes an average decrease in beneficiaries’ earnings of twenty cents. This suggests that the income effect represents an important factor in driving DI-induced reductions in earnings.
主题Public Economics ; Taxation ; Health, Education, and Welfare ; Health ; Labor Economics ; Demography and Aging ; Labor Supply and Demand
URLhttps://www.nber.org/papers/w21851
来源智库National Bureau of Economic Research (United States)
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条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579525
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GB/T 7714
Alexander Gelber,Timothy Moore,Alexander Strand. The Effect of Disability Insurance Payments on Beneficiaries\u2019 Earnings. 2016.
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