| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21857 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21857 |
| Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence | |
| Sebastian Galiani; Cheryl Long; Camila Navajas; Gustavo Torrens | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world’s societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain rents in the process of doing so. We experimentally explore the connections between the two. We identify two sets of models that incorporate both types of conflicts: electoral models with endogenous rents, and common-agency models. We adapt these models to a laboratory setting and test their main theoretical predictions using two experiments. In both cases we find support for the proposition that more intense horizontal conflict leads to higher rents, which is one of the theoretical predictions of the parametrized electoral and common-agency models that we have used. |
| 主题 | Microeconomics ; Welfare and Collective Choice |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21857 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579531 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sebastian Galiani,Cheryl Long,Camila Navajas,et al. Horizontal and Vertical Conflict: Experimental Evidence. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21857.pdf（1538KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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