| 来源类型 | Working Paper |
| 规范类型 | 报告 |
| DOI | 10.3386/w21859 |
| 来源ID | Working Paper 21859 |
| Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds | |
| Frederico Finan; Maurizio Mazzocco | |
| 发表日期 | 2016-01-11 |
| 出版年 | 2016 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | It is widely believed that politicians allocate public resources in ways to maximize political gains. But what is less clear is whether this comes at a cost to welfare; and if so, whether alternative electoral rules can help reduce these costs. In this paper, we address both of these questions by modeling and estimating politicians' decisions to allocate public funds. We use data from Brazil's federal legislature, which grants each federal legislator a budget to fund public projects in his state. We find that 26 percent of the public funds are distorted relative to a social planner's allocation. We then use the model to simulate several potential policies reforms to the electoral system, including adopting approval voting and implementing term limits. We find that an approval voting system reduces the distortions by 7.5 percent. Term limits also reduce distortions, but come at the cost of more corruption, which makes it a welfare-reducing policy. |
| 主题 | Public Economics ; Public Goods |
| URL | https://www.nber.org/papers/w21859 |
| 来源智库 | National Bureau of Economic Research (United States) |
| 引用统计 | |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/579533 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Frederico Finan,Maurizio Mazzocco. Electoral Incentives and the Allocation of Public Funds. 2016. |
| 条目包含的文件 | ||||||
| 文件名称/大小 | 资源类型 | 版本类型 | 开放类型 | 使用许可 | ||
| w21859.pdf（1838KB） | 智库出版物 | 限制开放 | CC BY-NC-SA | 浏览 | ||
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